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THE ROAD NOT TAKEN IN BROWN: RECOGNIZING THE
DUAL HARM OF SEGREGATION
Kevin Brown*
INTRODUCTION
S UPREME Court opinions like Brown v. Board of Education
reveal their consequences and yield their secrets only with the
passage of time. The Supreme Court candidly recognized this real-
ity seventeen years after it delivered Brown: "Nothing in our na-
tional experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for dealing with
changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity encoun-
tered since then."2 Fifty years have now elapsed since May 17,
1954, and the passage of time allows us to put perspective into a
reexamination of the opinion that launched American society into
the desegregation era and became the catalyst for astonishing
changes in race relations not only in public education, but through-
out American society.
In 1954, the Supreme Court came to a fork in the road in its
school segregation jurisprudence when Brown became the first
case to force the Court to articulate the harm generated by segre-
gation per se.3 Chief Justice Warren defined the primary harm of
segregation to be the negative psychological impact on African-
* Charles A. Whistler Professor of Law and the Director of the Hudson and Holland
Scholars Program, Indiana University Bloomington. B.S., Indiana University, 1978;
J.D., Yale Law School, 1982. The author would like to acknowledge the contribution
of his colleagues to this essay and thank them for their very helpful suggestions. These
include Jeannie Bell, Craig Bradley, Hannah Buxbaum, Dan Conkle, Roger Dworkin,
Robert Heidt, William Henderson, Ajah Mehorta, Christiana Ochoa, Aviva Orien-
stein, John Scanlan, Jeffrey Stake, and Susan Williams. In addition, the author would
like to thank Silvia Biers, Carmen Brun, Robyn Carr, Scott Timberman, and Daniel
Trammel for their excellent research assistance.
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
'Between 1938 and 1950, the Supreme Court addressed four cases dealing with
segregation in graduate and professional schools: Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). None of
these cases, however, required the Court to abandon the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which had been announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in
order to grant the black plaintiffs their requested relief.
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Americans alone, stating: "To separate [African-American youth]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the com-
munity that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.,
4
The Court went on to quote approvingly from the Kansas district
court:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of law; for the policy of separat-
ing the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a
child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental develop-
ment of negro children and to deprive them of some of the bene-
fits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.'
In the Court's famous footnote eleven, Chief Justice Warren
cited a number of authorities to support his conclusion that segre-
gation had a negative psychological effect on African-Americans.6
Although not cited by the Supreme Court, prominent social scien-
tists also filed an amicus brief with the Court on the same subject.7
A quote from this brief reveals the prevailing sentiment in the so-
cial sciences community about the effect of segregation on blacks:
[Tihe opinion stated by a large majority (90%) of social scientists
who replied to a questionnaire concerning the probable effects of
enforced segregation under conditions of equal facilities [is]...
that, regardless of the facilities which are provided, enforced seg-
regation is psychologically detrimental to the members of the
segregated group .... The available scientific evidence indicates
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
'Id.
6See id. at 494 n.11. Scholars expressed doubt about the actual influence of the so-
cial science evidence cited in Brown on the Court's decision from the very beginning.
See Ralph Ross & Ernst Van Den Haag, The Fabric of Society 165-66 (1957); Ed-
mond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 150, 157-58 & n.16 (1955). It is not
necessary, however, to take sides on that issue here. The fact is that the Court did
choose to rely on psychological evidence.
'Brief for Appellant app. at 1-20, Brown, 347 U.S. 483, available at 1952 WL 47265.
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that much, perhaps all, of the observable differences among vari-
ous racial and national groups may be adequately explained in
terms of environmental differences.8
Whether as an empirical matter the Court was correct about the
psychological state of Black America in 1954 (a point that has been
contested by later psychological research),9 the important point to
note is that the psychological harm caused by segregation that the
Court recognized was visited only upon African-Americans.
In striking down the deplorable institution of segregation, Chief
Justice Warren's opinion in Brown stands as the ultimate icon for
judicially declared equality. This iconic status, however, blinds
many of us to the underlying acceptance of African-American infe-
riority embedded in the Court's opinion. In Brown, the Supreme
Court declared that segregation had actually retarded the educa-
tional and mental development of black people. Since the Court
indicated that the harms inflicted by segregation were unlikely ever
to be undone,'0 presumably all blacks who had attended segregated
schools prior to 1954 were already damaged beyond repair. In
short, segregation had so infected the hearts and minds of African-
Americans that black inferiority was a foregone conclusion.
The Court's conclusions about the harm of segregation was far-
reaching and had profound effects upon both the Court's subse-
quent school desegregation jurisprudence and the public's percep-
tion about African-Americans. This rationale, that segregation was
unconstitutional solely because of the harm it inflicted on African-
Americans, created the impression that as a remedy for segrega-
tion, desegregation amounted to a social welfare program where
whites were compelled to donate in-kind contributions to blacks in
the form of interracial contact. In other words, if the harm occa-
sioned by segregation was one-sided and fell only on blacks, as
8 Id. app. at 10, 12.
9The research by the psychologist purporting to show that African-Americans in
public schools had lower self-esteem has been strenuously criticized. See, e.g., William
E. Cross, Jr., Shades of Black: Diversity in African-American Identity 115-16, 128-34
(1990) (arguing that the psychologists in Brown confused racial group preference with
self-esteem, assuming that racial group preference would automatically correspond
with self-esteem, and going on to note that direct measures of self-esteem developed
in the 1960s led to the conclusion that blacks did not suffer from low self-esteem even
in 1954).
0347 U.S. at 494.
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Brown indicated, integration conferred benefits only on blacks,
which necessarily were paid for by whites.
This social welfare notion was implicit in the Court's opinion
fourteen years later in Green v. New Kent County School Board."
In striking down a "freedom of choice" school assignment plan and
commanding public schools to pursue desegregation immediately,
the Court said, "[t]he constitutional rights of Negro school children
articulated in Brown I permit no less than [full integration]; and it
was to this end that Brown H commanded school boards to bend
their efforts." 2 The notion of desegregation as social welfare fur-
ther encouraged opposition to desegregation and fostered greater
resentment among the majority about the requirements imposed
on them by desegregation than might otherwise have been the
case.
But when the Supreme Court wrote the opinion in Brown there
was another path open before it. The appendix to the appellant's
brief in Brown described how prominent social scientists found
that segregation also harmed white students:
With reference to the impact of segregation and its concomitants
on children of the majority group, the report indicates that the
effects are somewhat more obscure. Those children who learn
the prejudices of our society are also being taught to gain per-
sonal status in an unrealistic and non-adaptive way. When com-
paring themselves to members of the minority group, they are
not required to evaluate themselves in terms of the more basic
standards of actual personal ability and achievement. The culture
permits and, at times, encourages them to direct their feelings of
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
2 Id. at 438 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court never abandoned this
view of the harm of segregation to blacks. In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288
(1977), the Court approved educational remedies to combat the effects of de jure seg-
regated schools. In justifying these remedies, the Milliken Court stated that
"[c]hildren who have been ... educationally and culturally set apart from the larger
community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting
their cultural isolation.... Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy the
impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the consequences linger." 433 U.S.
at 287. Thus, the Court's reasoning rested upon the belief that racial isolation had
damaged and would continue to damage only African-American children. See also
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485-86 (1992) (quoting Brown to support the proposi-
tion that desegregation is meant to remedy the psychological harm segregation inflicts
on black children).
1582 [Vol. 90:1579
The Road Not Taken in Brown
hostility and aggression against whole groups of people the
members of which are perceived as weaker than themselves.
They often develop patterns of guilt feelings, rationalizations and
other mechanisms which they must use in an attempt to protect
themselves from recognizing the essential injustice of their unreal-
istic fears and hatreds of minority groups."
Explicit recognition of the dual harm of segregation is what I re-
fer to here as the road not taken in Brown. In revisiting the Court's
opinion on its Golden Anniversary, my strategy is to return to this
historical crossroads to identify and clearly mark out a road indi-
cated but not taken. I will explore some of the possible ramifica-
tions of the dual harm path that was not taken and, thereby, illu-
minate some of the consequences of the Court's choice to rely on
social science opinion only insofar as the harm caused by segrega-
tion fell entirely to blacks.
As Part I will discuss, if the Brown Court had mentioned the
psychological harm visited on whites by segregation, then the no-
tion that desegregation is a social good for all children might have
had sufficient impact to alter the outcomes in subsequent cases like
Keyes v. School District Number 14 and Milliken v. Bradley5 ("Mil-
liken I"). Part II will discuss the implications of the road not taken
in Brown for the Supreme Court's decision upholding the affirma-
tive action program of the University of Michigan Law School in
Grutter v. Bollinger.'6 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the five-
Justice majority concluded that the educational and other benefits
of diversity were significant enough to constitute a compelling state
interest. These benefits are substantial and help increase the qual-
ity of all students' education. This diversity rationale is the flip side
of the dual harm path that was open to the Supreme Court in its
opinion in Brown: Arguing that segregation harmed all students
implies that a racially and ethnically diverse education would bene-
fit all students. While the diversity rationale in O'Connor's opinion
is a significant step forward from the Court's rationale in Brown, it
'" Brief for Appellant app. at 6, Brown, 347 U.S. 483, available at 1952 WL 47265
(emphasis added).
14413 U.S. 189 (1973).
'5418 U.S. 717 (1974).
S539 U.S. 306 (2003).
158320041
1584 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 90:1579
did not completely reject the social welfare perspective. The treat-
ment of affirmative action in Justice O'Connor's opinion does not
call into question the assumption that the minority students who
are deemed beneficiaries of affirmative action are less qualified to
attend selective colleges, universities and graduate programs than
their white (and now Asian-American) counterparts. Thus, af-
firmative action can be viewed as another social welfare program
where whites are being asked to donate in-kind benefits-once
again-this time by sacrificing places in selective higher educa-
tional institutions.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter strongly indicates that the
Court will revisit the issue of affirmative action within the next
twenty-five years.17 At that point in time, the Court will once again
face the same fork in the road that was presented to it fifty years
ago in Brown. Will that future Supreme Court fully recognize the
benefits of diversity to both black and white students, completely
abandon any sense of a social welfare perspective, and finally
choose the road not taken in Brown?
I. EFFECTS ON DESGREGATION: REVISITING KEYES AND MILLIKEN I
This Part provides a brief look at how the Supreme Court's
school desegregation jurisprudence might have changed if the
Court had recognized that segregation harmed both blacks and
whites. This Part focuses on two major cases, Keyes and Milliken I,
which significantly limited the imposition of school desegregation
remedies. If the Court had noted the dual nature of the harm of
segregation, the results in those cases might have been different,
and federal courts might still be presiding over expanding integra-
tive efforts in public schools, rather than over their demise. 18
I? Id. at 343.
Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurring opinion in Grutter that figures from
2000 to 2001 indicate that 71.6% of African-American children and 76.3% of Latino
children attend majority-minority schools. 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring) (citing Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, & Gary Orfield, A Multicultural
Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? 28 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.
pdf) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). Ginsburg did not note that
this represents a trend of increasing racial and ethnic separation in the public schools.
Over the past fifteen years the amount of segregation in public elementary and sec-
ondary schools has been increasing for African-Americans. The percentage of Afri-
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Keyes was the first Supreme Court opinion addressing the issue
of school segregation in a state (Colorado) where, in 1954, the pub-
lic schools were not segregated pursuant to state statutory author-
ity.19 Thus, the Court was required to formulate a method for lower
federal courts to use in order to distinguish segregated school sys-
tems operating in violation of the Equal Protection Clause from
those that were not. The Supreme Court drew a distinction be-
tween de jure and de facto segregation. A de jure segregated
school system was one where the current condition of segregation
resulted from intentional state action intended to segregate the
schools. This violated the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, if the
plaintiffs challenging segregated schools could not establish that
the segregation was not the result of intentional governmental con-
duct, then there was no constitutional violation.
The adoption of an intent standard to determine which school
systems were unconstitutionally segregated, as opposed to a focus
on the actual existence of racial and ethnic segregation, hampered
the efforts to desegregate public schools. The standard made the
effort of establishing a constitutional violation tedious, expensive,
and protracted. "Six weeks of trial [producing] more than four
thousand pages of testimony and nearly two thousand exhibits' [is]
not uncommon in the search for constitutional violations."'2 The
can-American students attending majority-minority schools increased from 62.9% in
1980-81 to 71.6% in 2000-01. Frankenberg, supra, at 77. The percentage of African-
Americans in schools that are 90% or more minority has also been increasing. The
percentage has increased from 32.5% for the 1986-87 school year to 37.4% in 2000-
01. Id. Latinos actually experience higher rates of segregation than blacks. For Lati-
nos segregation has been increasing since the 1968-69 school year. At that time 54.8%
were in majority-minority schools and only 23.1% were in schools that were at least
90% minority. In 2000-01, the percentage of Latinos in predominately minority
schools increased to 76.3% and the percent in schools that are over 90% minority in-
creased to 37.4%. Id. As Professor Amy Stuart Wells pointed out, the research shows
that "separate poor and all-black schools in highly segregated inner cities could never
be equal to predominantly white and wealthy suburban schools." Amy Stuart Wells,
The "Consequences" of School Desegregation: The Mismatch Between the Research
and the Rationale, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 771, 786 (2001).
" 413 U.S. 189. The Court in Keyes also addressed for the first time the issue of how
to treat Hispanics for purposes of de jure segregation of public schools. Id. at 195-96.
Because most of the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisprudence was devel-
oped within the context of race relations between blacks and whites, this article fo-
cuses on de jure segregation of public schools within the context of that relationship.2 j. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke 199 (1979).
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cost of obtaining and introducing such evidence was no doubt
enough to discourage many potential plaintiffs from going to court
at all. Even though courts almost always found de jure segregation
whenever litigation was "seriously pursued,"'" many school districts
were never found to be unconstitutionally segregated.
This line of cases also led to inconsistent results. For example, at
the same time a federal judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan, ruled
that optional attendance zones, construction of schools in segre-
gated neighborhoods, and assignments of black teachers to black
schools all had permissible explanations,22 a different federal judge
in nearby Kalamazoo, Michigan, held similar practices to be un-
constitutional.23 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed both of the
lower court decisions."
The state action requirement of the Equal Protection Clause
created a need to draw a distinction between de jure segregation
and de facto segregation. Viewing the harm of segregation as dual,
however, would almost certainly have affected where the line be-
tween de jure and de facto segregation was drawn. If a court only
looked to the immediate past, that line may have been difficult to
find. But a court motivated by the desire to remedy a dual harm
might have taken a broader view of de jure segregation. Such a
court could have looked at the legacy of slavery, Jim Crow, and
other forms of disenfranchisement that led to the creation of racial
division and housing patterns, to find that the present state action
maintaining the status quo constituted de jure segregation. Or, with
the view that the harm of segregation was dual, courts might have
been willing to lighten the evidentiary burden required to establish
de jure segregation. Courts might have started with a rebuttable
presumption that de facto segregation was the result of govern-
mental conduct. Thus, the burden and expense of establishing that
the segregation of the schools was not attributable to governmental
conduct would be placed on the school system.
The point here is not that the courts would necessarily engage in
such an exercise explicitly. But if the prevailing rationale was that
21 Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? 24 (1978).
22 Higgins v. Bd. of Educ., 395 F. Supp. 444, 462-78 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
23 Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143,194-201 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
24 Higgins v. Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974).
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remedies for de jure segregation, especially desegregation, bene-
fited both white and black students, then judges would not be per-
ceived to be coercing in-kind donations from whites for the benefit
of blacks. Judges might then have been more willing to push the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation in favor of a
finding of de jure segregation using various doctrinal tools. Even
with the de jure/de facto distinction, over time the notion of a dual
harm could have produced significantly more desegregated schools.
In addition to being more willing to find conditions that warrant
a remedy, recognition of the dual harm of segregation might have
allowed courts to apply broader remedies. In the 1974 Milliken I
opinion, the Court addressed an interdistrict school desegregation
remedy for the first time.25 After concluding that the Detroit public
schools were unconstitutionally segregated, the district court im-
posed an interdistrict desegregation plan that included the City of
Detroit and fifty-three of its surrounding suburban school districts.
White students comprised only 34.8% of Detroit's 1970 public
school student body," a number the district court felt was insuffi-
cient to allow for successful integration. In order for meaningful in-
tegration to occur, it was necessary to include the predominantly
white suburban school systems in the desegregation decree. The
district court felt justified in including the suburban school systems
in the remedy because it viewed local school districts as creations
of the State of Michigan. Since agencies of the state were also re-
sponsible for the segregated schools in Detroit, it seemed logical to
include these state-created school districts in the remedial plan to
cure the constitutional violation caused-in part-by the state.27
In Milliken I the Supreme Court rejected the inclusion of the
suburban schools in the desegregation remedy, concluding that ab-
sent a showing that a constitutional violation within one district
produced a significant segregating effect in another, there was no
constitutional justification for cross-district remedies.28 This deci-
sion was a full retreat from the efforts to integrate public schools.
25418 U.S. 717 (1974).
26 Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd in part and va-
cated in part, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
27 Id. at 594-95. This is also an example of how a court might use its discretion to be
more willing to find de jure segregation.28418 U.S. at 745.
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Since the overwhelming majority of suburban school districts were
of relatively recent origins, few of these school systems would be
included in desegregation orders. Thus, after Milliken I the general
rule was that a desegregation remedy would stop at the boundary
of the offending school district. As a result many of the major ur-
ban school districts were never desegregated because there were
too few white students in them.29 The situation was exacerbated be-
cause the Court's decision in Milliken I provided an incentive for
any white parent who wanted to avoid a school desegregation de-
cree to simply move to a suburban school district. Many of these
parents may have been motivated by invidious intent in deciding to
avoid sending their children to integrated schools. Some, however,
could rationally justify their decision by pointing to the Supreme
Court's rationale in Brown. Since segregation had psychologically
damaged black people, black school children were not the best
classmates for their children. Given the understanding that deseg-
regation was primarily for the benefit of black students, why then
should these concerned parents sacrifice the interest of their be-
loved children for the welfare of others? If the Brown Court had
recognized that segregation harms both minority and white stu-
dents, perhaps the Milliken I Court would have been more willing
to expand interdistrict remedies, along the lines suggested by the
district court.
Of course, some line would still need to be drawn in order to
limit interdistrict school desegregation remedies. For example, in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education the Court
addressed several practical issues relating to school desegregation
29 According to figures published by the United States Department of Education for
1984, nine of the ten largest school districts in the United States do not have as large a
percentage of white students as there were in Detroit in 1970. These districts are:
1. New York City, NY 22.8%
2. Los Angeles, CA 19.7%
3. Chicago, IL 13.1%
4. Dade County (Miami), FL 26.6%
5. Philadelphia, PA 25.4%
6. Detroit, MI 10.4%
7. Houston, TX 19.0%
8. Hawaii, HI 23.1%
9. Dallas, TX 23.3%
Center for Education Statistics, Office of Education Research and Improvement, U.S.
Dept. of Educ., The Condition of Education 179 (1987).
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remedies."0 In addressing the issue of the transportation of students
in pursuit of an intradistrict desegregation remedy, the Court
stated:
An objection to transportation of students may have validity
when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the
health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
process.... It hardly needs stating that the limits on time of
travel will vary with many factors, but probably with none more
than the age of the students.'
Thus, the limit of school desegregation remedies would not have
been the boundary lines of urban school districts. Rather, the limit
would be based entirely on convenience, not constitutional limits.
If the Court in Brown had recognized the dual harm inflicted by
segregation, then it would not have made sense to draw the de jure
and de facto line where it did, because encouraging school deseg-
regation was beneficial to all public school students. In addition,
since the Court would have been proclaiming the benefits of deseg-
regation for all students, it is also unlikely that the Court would
have allowed the artificial limit on school desegregation remedies
by stopping them at the school district boundaries as in Milliken I.
The Court more likely would have approved cross-district desegre-
gation remedies when they were necessary to negate the existence
of de facto segregated public schools. The probable result of rec-
ognizing the dual harm in Brown would have been that on its
Golden Anniversary integration of public schools, rather than re-
segregation, would be increasing. In short, the argument in this
Part is that recognizing a dual harm would have likely allowed the
Court to justify broader remedial solutions in the subsequent
school desegregation cases.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE DUAL HARM RATIONALE ON AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
The road not taken by the Court in Brown contemplated that
segregation harmed both black and white students, albeit in differ-
ent ways. On this view, remedies for de jure segregation were to




benefit all students, not just black students. The diversity rationale
articulated in the summer of 2003 by the Supreme Court in the af-
firmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger 2 is arguably the flip side
of that same coin: The state may use race-based admissions proce-
dures because diversity (integration) benefits everyone, not only
minorities. The Court's opinion in Grutter strongly indicates that
the Court will revisit the issue of affirmative action within the next
twenty-five years. At that point in time, the Court will once again
face the same fork in the road that was presented to it fifty years
ago in Brown. Will that future Court choose the road not taken in
Brown?
Applying strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the five-
Justice majority in Grutter upheld the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions policy. The policy provided for the use of racial
and ethnic classifications as part of a holistic admissions process that
sought to ensure the admission of a critical mass of students from
groups that have been historically discriminated against, like Afri-
can-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans.33 Without this
commitment, these groups might not be represented in meaningful
numbers.
Justice O'Connor noted that the educational benefits of enroll-
ing a critical mass of minority students are substantial:
[T]he Law School's admissions policy promotes "cross-racial un-
derstanding," helps to break down racial stereotypes, and "en-
ables [students] to better understand persons of different races."
These benefits are "important and laudable," because "class-
room discussion is livelier, more spirited and simply more
enlightening and interesting" when the students have "the great-
est possible variety of backgrounds.""
Justice O'Connor also noted additional benefits that flow from
diverse student bodies that are not directly related to improve-
ments in the academic environment. For example, major American
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3 Id. at 306.
Id. at 330 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor, however, also notes that "[t]he
Law School does not premise its need for critical mass on 'any belief that minority
students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint
on any issue."' Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
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businesses have made it clear that the skills needed in the increas-
ingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure
to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Quoting
the brief filed by high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders
of the military, Justice O'Connor also noted that
a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential
to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security."... At present, "the military cannot achieve
an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse
unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-
conscious recruiting and admissions policies."35
Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that universities, and in particular,
law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of
our nation's leaders, and in order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path
to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals
of every race and ethnicity.36
The aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion noting the benefits of
diversity is consistent with the road not traveled in Brown. Taking
account of race to bring students together benefits all students in
our society. Thus, affirmative action resting upon the justifications
of the benefits of diversity, and school desegregation justified by
the recognition of the dual harm of segregation, both point to the
benefit for all students and all Americans of taking account of race
and ethnicity to further integrate education. From the perspective
of the road not taken in Brown, school desegregation based upon
the recognition of the dual harm and affirmative action based on
the benefits of diversity are not social welfare programs for minori-
ties with a history of discrimination. Rather, they are educationally
justified programs that benefit everyone.
But there is another aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion that
views affirmative action as another social welfare program, as
school desegregation was cast by the Supreme Court in Brown.
The justifications provided by Justice O'Connor for allowing selec-
tive colleges, universities, and graduate programs to consider race
Id. at 331 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al., at 27).36Id. at 330-33.
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and ethnicity are compelling ones. But implicit in these justifica-
tions is the recognition that underrepresented minorities are not as
qualified as their white and Asian-American counterparts. From
this point of view, lowering admissions standards in order to ensure
adequate numbers of blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans,
means that the Court is once again sanctioning a situation where
whites (and now Asian-Americans as well) are compelled to sacri-
fice for the benefit of these minority groups. In speaking of the
gaps in what he called "academic credentials,, 37 Justice Thomas,
" I see the primary problem with the affirmative action debate to be connected to
different performance on standardized tests. For example, whites with equivalent un-
dergraduate grade point averages ("UGPAs") are much more likely to be admitted to
at least one law school than any other group: 72% for white applicants, 69% for
Asian-Americans, 60% for Hispanics, 61% for Chicanos, 62% for Native Americans,
and 46% for African-Americans. See William C. Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking
Gender Bias on the LSAT and its Relationship to Racial Diversity in Legal Educa-
tion, 12 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 14 tbl.4 (2000). In addition, a Kidder study of appli-
cants to Boalt Hall revealed some startling results. William C. Kidder, Does the
LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?:
A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 Cal. L. Rec. 1055 (2001).
He matched African-American, Chicano and Latino, Native American, and Asian-
Pacific-American applicants with Caucasian applicants who possessed equivalent
UGPAs from the same colleges during the same time period. Id. at 1058. What he
found was that even when controlling for these factors, African-Americans scored 9.2
points lower on the Law School Admissions Test ("LSAT"), Chicano and Latino 6.8
points lower; Native Americans 4.0 points lower; and Asian-Pacific-Americans 2.5
points lower than white students. Id. at 1074 tbl.1. Kidder also found that when he ad-
justed for undergraduate major there was no significant difference. Id. at 1079-80.
Thus, all major minority groups scored lower on the LSAT than whites even when
holding their date of graduation, college or university attended, UGPA, and major
constant.
National data also indicates that testing imposes a greater barrier than do other
measures of performance. See, e.g., William T. Dickens & Thomas J. Kane, Racial
Test Score Differences as Evidence of Reverse Discrimination: Less than Meets the
Eye, 38 Indus. Rel. 331, 338, 361-62 (1999) (indicating that data from the High School
and Beyond survey, a nationally representative sample of youth, revealed a smaller
black-white gap in high school grades than in Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT")
scores). The percentage plans adopted in California, Florida, and Texas for determin-
ing admissions to their selective colleges are also based on this assumption. They
point to a way to maintain minority admissions in undergraduate education, at least if
race conscious admissions programs had been struck down, by placing more emphasis
on grades. See id.; see also William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School Exams,
and Meritocracy: The Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed 82
Tex. L. Rev. 975 (2004). "The LSAT is a univariate test designed to measure reason-
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dissenting in Grutter, pointed to the fact that while African-
Americans constitute 11.3% of those who take the Law School
Admissions Test ("LSAT"), they constitute only 1.0% of those
who score over 165.38 Thomas goes on to note that this gap was es-
sentially the same as it was seven years earlier. Thomas also noted
that
[w]hites scoring between 163 and 167 on the LSAT are routinely
rejected by the Law School .... [I]n 2000, 209 out of 422 white
applicants were rejected in this scoring range .... Blacks, on the
other hand, are nearly guaranteed admission if they score above
155 .... 63 out of 77 black applicants are accepted with LSAT
scores above 155.
Though the Grutter opinion was about law school admissions, a
quick look at the performance of different racial and ethnic groups
on the Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT") and ACT tell us that
these gaps in "academic credentials" exist in undergraduate admis-
sions at selective colleges and universities. According to the Col-
lege Board's 2003 National Report profiling SAT test takers, the
gap between the SAT scores of African-Americans and that of
ing ability. Test-taking speed is assumed to be an ancillary variable with a negligible
effect on candidate scores." Henderson, supra, at 975. In reporting results from a
study he conducted with data obtained from a national and a regional law school, Pro-
fessor Henderson disaggregated law school grades into three distinct testing methods
used in law schools with varying degrees of time pressure: (1) in-class exams, (2) take-
home exams, and (3) papers. His data showed that "the LSAT was a relatively robust
predictor of in-class exams and a relatively weak predictor of take-home exams and
papers." Id. From this data Henderson argues that a part of the predictive ability of
the LSAT for law school GPA is based not on reasoning ability, but on test-taking
speed. Henderson also notes that
when speed is used as a variable on law school exams, the type of testing
method, independent of knowledge and preparation, can change the ordering
(i.e., relative grades) of individual test takers. The current emphasis on time-
pressured law school exams, therefore, may skew measures of merit in ways
that have little theoretical connection to the actual practice of law. Finally, this
study found some preliminary evidence that the performance gap between
white and minority students may be smaller on less time-pressured testing
methods, including blind-graded, take-home exams.
Id. at 976.
38Id. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Law
School Admission Council, National Statistical Report (2001)).
" Id. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Law
School Admission Council, National Statistical Report (2001)).
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non-Hispanic whites is still 206 points (1063 and 857, respec-
tively)." This racial gap has actually increased over the past ten
years." The increasing gaps in the performance of black students
on the SAT parallels the abandonment of school desegregation
that is leading to the resegregation of public schools. 2 The gaps are
also increasing for all Latino groups as well, excluding Puerto Ri-
cans. 3 There are also significant racial and ethnic gaps between the
performance of blacks and non-Hispanic whites on the ACT where
the average composite score of African-Americans is 16.9 com-
pared to 21.7 for whites." This gap held fairly consistently over the
45past seven years.
Current gaps on standardized tests and increasing racial and
ethnic segregation in public schools strongly suggest that racial and
'The College Board, 2003 College-Bound Seniors: A Profile of SAT Test Takers 6
(2003), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod-downloads/about/newsinfo/
cbsenior/yr2003/pdf/2003_TOTALGRPPRD.pdf (on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association).
' For the 1990-91 assessment year the gap was only 187 points (1031 as opposed to
846). In the 1996-97 assessment year the gap had increased to 195 points (1052 as op-
posed to 857); in 1998-99 it was 199 (1055-856); and in 2000-01 it was 201 (1060-859).
National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Educ. Stat. 2002, at 154 tbl.133
(2002), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003060.pdf (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
42 See supra note 18 for the statistics.
4 For Hispanics or Latinos, the 1990-91 assessment year gap was only 111 points
(1031 as opposed to 920). In the 1996-97 assessment year the gap had increased to 118
points (1052-934); in 1998-99 it was 128 (1025-927); and in 2000-01 it was 135 (1060-
925). For Mexican-Americans the 1990-91 assessment year gap was only 118 points
(1031-913). In the 1996-97 assessment year the gap had increased to 143 points (1052-
909); in 1998-99 it was 146 (1055-909); and in 2000-01 it was 151 (1060-909). But for
Puerto Ricans in the 1990-91 assessment year, the gap was 166 (1031-865). In the
1996-97 assessment year the gap had decreased to 151 (1052-901); in 1998-99 it was
152 (1055-903); and in 2000-01 it was 152 (1060-908). See National Center for Educa-
tion Statistics, supra note 41, at 154 tbl.133 (2002).
" ACT, Inc., 2003 ACT National and State Scores, tbl.1, at http://www.act.org/
news/data/03/index.html (Aug. 20, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation).
4 For students graduating in 1997, for example, the average ACT score for blacks
was 17.1 compared to 21.7 for whites. Most racial/ethnic groups-American Indian,
Mexican-American, and other Hispanics-all scored lower on the ACT than Cauca-
sians (19.0, 18.8, and 19.0, respectively, compared to 21.7), while Asian-Americans
had the same average score as Caucasians (21.7). See ACT, Inc., The 1997 ACT High
School Profile Report-National Normative Data, tbls.5-7, at http://www.act.org/
news/data/97/97data.html (last accessed Aug. 20, 2004) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
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ethnic gaps on standardized tests are likely to continue for the
foreseeable future. What makes the existence of these gaps so
important is the time limit placed on the use of racial and ethnic
preferences by Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter. Justice
O'Connor concludes her opinion by stating: "We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be nec-
essary to further the interest approved today."46 Justice Ginsburg's
concurring opinion no doubt expressed the concern about racial
gaps in academic credentials felt by many supporters of affirmative
action more accurately: "From today's vantage point, one may
hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span,
progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportu-
nity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action." 7 But, as the
above statistics about the persistence of the gaps on standardized
tests suggest, Justice Thomas's more pessimistic interpretation of
this problem may be the most accurate one: "No one can seriously
contend, and the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic
credentials will disappear in 25 years."48
These realities clearly indicate that, given Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the Court will have to revisit the issue of affirmative ac-
tion in the future. At that point in time the Court will have to
squarely address the issue of the persistent racial and ethnic gaps in
standardized test scores. Thus, the Court will once again reach the
same fork in the road that was first presented to it fifty years ago in
Brown. If the Court had recognized the existence of the dual harm
of segregation then it would be obvious how assuming measures of
academic qualifications are racially neutral generates the same
dual harm today. Given the existence of significant racial and eth-
nic gaps on standardized tests such as the SAT, the ACT, and the
LSAT, these tests are sending a message of black intellectual infe-
riority as well as providing the rationalizations and other mecha-
nisms for the continued under representation of groups with a his-
tory of discrimination in positions of authority in our society.
For the future Supreme Court to completely reject the social
welfare conception of affirmative action that is still embedded in
46 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
41 Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 376 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice O'Connor's opinion, it will have to recognize the dual harm
of this society's history of racial oppression. The future Court will
be compelled to question the embedded assumption that the crite-
ria for merit are racially and ethnically neutral.' 9 It would no doubt
explode the fallacious reasoning that has become common fare for
whites denied admission to selective colleges, universities, and
graduate programs who often assert that if they had been black,
their test scores would have been good enough for admission to the
program of their choice. This fallacious reasoning fails to recognize
the undeniable impact of race and racism that is still an aspect of
everyday American life. If all of the blacks, Latinos, and Native
Americans who were admitted with lower test scores had been
white, their entire lives in America would have been different. Part
of that difference would no doubt translate into significantly higher
scores on standardized tests. Thus, the would-be white applicant
would find him or herself in the same relative position with regard
to academic credentials that they find themselves in now. To as-
sume that the grades and standardized test scores of whites could
be compared to those of African-Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans requires acceptance of the position that race and eth-
nicity have no more relevance in our society than would eye color
in a society where all had access to color contact lenses. Simply put,
49 Justice Douglas did precisely this in his dissenting opinion from the dismissal as
moot of the first affirmative action case that reached the Supreme Court in 1974. See
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In his opin-
ion, Douglas noted that the psychological harm of America's history of racial oppres-
sion had a dual nature: "The years of slavery did more than retard the progress of
blacks. Even a greater wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead of
humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a superior race." Id. at 336.
Douglas noted in his opinion that those who make the LSAT, and law schools that
use it, point to a correlation between the test scores and first-year grades. He ac-
knowledged that the test does seem to do better than chance at such predictions.
Nevertheless, Douglas noted:
"The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States." The
Law School's admissions policy cannot be reconciled with that purpose, unless
cultural standards of a diverse rather than a homogeneous society are taken
into account.... The key to the problem is the consideration of each applica-
tion in a racially neutral way. Since the LSAT reflects questions touching on cul-
tural backgrounds, the Admissions Committee acted properly in my view in set-
ting minority applications apart for separate processing. These minorities have
cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from the dominant Caucasian.
Id. at 334 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)).
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not only do race and ethnicity matter, but they are likely to con-
tinue to matter twenty-five years from now, and matter in particu-
larly negative ways for underrepresented minority groups with a
history of discrimination. After all, it is that history of discrimina-
tion that explains their underrepresentation in the pool of high
standardized test scores in the first place."0
CONCLUSION
In revisiting the Court's opinion in Brown on its Golden Anni-
versary, my strategy has been to return to this historical crossroads
with the aim of identifying and clearly marking out a road indi-
cated but not taken. When the Supreme Court wrote the opinion in
Brown, it rested its decision on the psychological harm segregation
inflicted on blacks. According to the Court's pronouncement, seg-
regation-with the sanction of law-had a tendency to retard the
mental and educational development of blacks. But when the
Court rendered its opinion in Brown there was another path open
before it. The social science appendix in the appellant's brief sub-
mitted to the Court not only pointed out the harm of segregation
inflicted upon black school children, but also noted that segrega-
tion caused psychological harm to the majority group. According
to prevailing social science opinion, the majority children often de-
velop patterns of guilt feelings, rationalizations, and other mecha-
nisms that they must use in an attempt to protect themselves from
501 do not want to overstate the racial gap between whites and blacks (or other un-
derrepresented minority groups) that exists on standardized tests or their experiences
living in the United States. Standardized tests are used to measure the differences be-
tween people that take them. If 99% of the knowledge and understanding among
people is the same, then this 99% would be excluded for purposes of standardized
tests because it would tell us nothing about how those who take the test differ from
one another. Only the differences among individuals matter for purposes of assessing
their abilities through the use of standardized tests. Thus, if the average life experi-
ence of African-Americans and other minorities in this society is only slightly dissimi-
lar from that of non-Hispanic whites, that slight dissimilarity will translate into huge
divergences at the upper end of the test score range of standardized tests drafted only
to measure the differences among people. In other words, the very reason that law
schools recognize that students from underrepresented groups with a history of dis-
crimination are likely to bring a different perspective to the table is also the very rea-
son that they are not likely to do as well on culturally biased standardized examina-
tions.
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recognizing the essential injustice done to blacks.5' Thus, the social
science appendix pointed out that segregation produced a dual
harm.
If the Supreme Court had mentioned the psychological harm vis-
ited on whites by segregation in its opinion in Brown, then it would
have been clear that remedies for de jure segregation, especially
desegregation, were for the benefit of all public school students.
Viewing the harm of de jure segregation as a dual harm would
have justified more extensive racial and ethnic desegregation in
public schools than actually occurred during the past fifty years be-
cause courts would have been more able both to find de jure segre-
gation and to allow more expansive remedies.
Recognition of the dual nature of the harm of de jure segrega-
tion would also have affected the discussion of affirmative action
instituted by selective colleges, universities, and graduate pro-
grams. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter noted the
benefits of diversity. This aspect of her opinion was consistent with
the road not traveled in Brown. School desegregation justified by
the recognition of the dual harm of segregation and affirmative ac-
tion resting upon the justifications of the benefits of diversity both
point to the benefit to all students from taking account of race and
ethnicity to further integrated education.
But Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter was not a complete
endorsement of the road not taken in Brown. The Court's explana-
tion in Brown that the harm of segregation was confined to the
negative psychological impact on blacks turned remedies for de
jure segregation, particularly desegregation, into a social welfare
program for blacks. Whites were being compelled to donate in-
kind benefits in the form of interracial contact to blacks. Another
aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter casts affirmative
action as being another social welfare program for minorities with
a history of discrimination. Implicit in the articulations of the justi-
fications for diversity is the proposition that underrepresented mi-
norities are not as academically qualified as their non-Hispanic
white and Asian-American counterparts. From this point of view,
lowering admissions standards in order to assure adequate num-
bers of blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans means that the
" Brief for Appellant app. at 6, Brown, 347 U.S. 483, available at 1952 WL 47265.
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Court is once again sanctioning a situation where whites, and now
Asian-Americans, are compelled to sacrifice for the benefit of
these minority groups. Whites and Asian-Americans are being
asked to sacrifice in-kind benefits in the form of places of admis-
sions in selective colleges, universities, and graduate programs to
underrepresented minorities with a history of discrimination.
Given the twenty-five year grace period for affirmative action
included in the Supreme Court's opinion in Grutter, the Court will
be compelled to revisit the issue of affirmative action in the future.
When the Court revisists this issue it will once again come to the
same fork in the road that it came to fifty years ago when it ren-
dered its opinion in Brown. When that time comes, I hope it will
choose to send America down the road not taken in Brown.

